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Abstract:  In the implement of Basel Accord, problems like regulatory capital 
arbitrage came up for the shortcomings of the accord. Securitization and other 
financial innovations have provided opportunities to reduce the regulatory capital 
requirements with little or no reduction in the overall economic risks. The possibility 
of regulatory capital arbitrage was caused by the inaccurate classification of the risks 
of different assets under Basel Accord. One of the routine methods is asset 
securitization, which will create value for banks while damaging the effect of the 
capital adequacy ratio as a prudential policy instrument. To deal with RCA 
(regulatory capital arbitrage), the most important is to match the regulatory capital to 
different assets and cut the motivation from the source so as to unify regulatory capital 
and economic capital. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
In 1988, Basel Accord was adopted and implemented all over the world. It unified the formation of capital and 
determined each risk weight for different assets in and out of the balance sheet，regulated the goal ratio between 
capital and risk assets, which provided a level for measuring the risk exposure of the international banking financial 
institutions. But some problems happened in the implement of this accord , RCA is a typical innovation giving great 
impetus to the effect implement. Now China is also bounded with the 1988 accord, the regulatory agency will 
counter with the challenge from the problem of regulatory capital arbitrage.          
The direct reason for securitization is Basel Accord. Under the frame of this accord, banks have but 
two options to achieve boosting their capital ratio (a) increasing the capital appearing in the numerators 
of the ratio, or (b) decreasing the total risk-weighted assets appearing in the denominators. Apart from 
these traditional adjustments, banks may attempt to boost reported capital ratios by “cosmetic” methods 
such as RCA through reorganizing assets and diversifying risks, which do little to enhance underlying 
safety and soundness.  
To the mean and value of securitization, scholars give different understandings from each angle. John 
Henderson (1988) ,from the financing process and product effect ,thought that securitization was a 
process in which assets in credit institutions would be moved out of the balance sheet, then investors 
bought those negotiable instruments insuring the liabilities with no or limited recourse to the initial 
creditor. Gardener(1995) thought through securitization , credit of the open market could substitute the 
Dai Junxun, Wang Guan/Management Science and Engineering 
 Vol.1 No.1 2007 45-50 
 46
closed credit of banks or other financial institutions. Jason H.P. Kravitt (1996) gave his view that assets 
financing could become more efficient by utilizing advanced knowledge to foresee financial reports and 
to perfect the organization. With development of theories, they have become more close to practice. John 
deason(1998) came up with a more accurate definition: securitization was a process in which the 
receivable accounts cash flows of the sponsor would be changed into steady repayment cash flows, so 
the sponsor could mobilize funds through issuing bonds . And these bonds had limited recourse to the 
credit of receivable accounts but the sponsor. 
Practically, when banks are required to maintain the capital adequacy ratio beyond their willing, they 
will deal with the regulatory capital level as “regular tax” (Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991). Banks tend to 
avoid it or make it minimum by regulatory capital arbitraging. A lot of research shows that the behavior 
of banks would be affected by “regular tax” including minimum capital requirement、required reserves 
and other deposit insurance premiums (Cumming ,1987; Baer and Pavel,1988; Berger and Udell,1993 
and Jagtiani et al,1995；Koppenhaver,1989). Whether or not to carry out RCA and the scale would be 
realized by cost-benefit analysis to achieve the expected reduction of organizational cost (Cumming, 
1987; Pennacchi, 1988; James, 1988; Chhikara and Hanson, 1993). 
Early in the 1970s, securitization initialized in the USA to promote the liquidity of the second market 
of MBSs (mortgage backed securities) under the strict financial regulations. And in the 1980s it was 
introduced into European countries and then Asia in 1990s. America is the most developing countries in 
securitization and has the biggest securitization market in the world. Advanced computer processing 
system and developed financial market provide huge room to the liquidity of ABSs (Assets backed 
securities). Perfect and elastic laws create broad flat form for the complex securitization. The UK is the 
biggest securitization market in Europe. It has loose system to promote development of securitization. 
Different from America and the UK, Italia developed international securitization because of the barriers 
from internal finance and laws. In Asia, securitization just has the first step. To some extent we have 
gone into this field, and some laws and regulations have been promulgated. At present, in the United 
States and Britain ,the asset securitization experience、maturity of the technology and continuous 
innovation are the best examples we should learn from. 
In the domestic market, computer technology and other areas, Japan、Italy and France are not as good 
as the USA, So the administrators in these countries hold a cautious and  more stringent attitude towards 
securitization. But these countries are also under the specific circumstances of promoting domestic 
securitization process and becoming spectacular emerging markets.  
There are some defects in Basel Accord in risk measurement approaches, different divisions of 
different risk assets are not defined accurately, which result in the possibility of bank regulatory capital 
arbitrage. For example, when the banks sell their assets to enhance the provision of credit, like credit 
guarantee as recourse, In fact by loss Drawing, is 100% risk weight; If these are not secured assets owned 
by banks, they are called "direct credit substitute" based on the bank's credit as an alternative to business 
credit, which are applied to the 8% capital requirement. For the big difference in risks measuring ,banks 
can lower capital requirements by simply changing the asset structure and risk disposal arrangements, 
and then reach the regulatory capital requirements without increasing the bank's capital burden or risk 
adjusted total assets. 
 
2.  THE SPECIFIC OPERATION OF REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE 
ASSET SECURITIZATION 
 
Asset Securitization is a normal means in RCA, which is utilized the tremendous differences between real economic 
portfolio risks an  corresponding risks measured according to Basel Accord, to reduce the bank's total risk assets and 
capital requirements bypassing the capital regulation. On the surface, it reaches the level of capital adequacy ratio, in 
fact much lower than under the Basel Accord capital requirement. Below we have examples to show the specific 
operation of regulatory capital arbitrage asset securitization. 
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(a) The capital adequacy without asset securitization. 
Supposing a bank has 200 Yuan loans, 176 Yuan from deposits and 22 Yuan from equity capital and 2 
Yuan from loss reserves. Ignoring taxes, the core capital and total capital adequacy ratios of the bank are 
11% and 12%. 
(b) The capital adequacy with Non-risk retained assets securitization 
 
Here the bank securitized 40 Yuan loans on the balance sheet and sold to the SPV and achieved a real 
sale. The SPV issued 40 Yuan ABSs and then sold to investors. Non-risk was retained in this approach 
because the banks had a real sale of it’s assets without providing credit enhancement or recourse. So the 
assets (loans) could be moved out of the balance sheet, and the provision of this bank had been improved.  
(c) The capital adequacy under securitization with recourse. 
From Fig.2 we can see the assets were sold to the SPV, which enjoyed some recourse. The existence 
of recourse would not undermine the real sale, but its extent would decide the nature of the transaction. 
Dislike traditional modes of financing, asset securitization will achieve the specific assets pool primarily 
through the transferring of assets, and become an independent property different from credit of the 
sponsor. Actually, the transferring of assets can be identified as a "true sale” or "secured financing": as a 
"true sales", the assets are sold completely from the hands of the sponsor and terminated on the balance 
sheet, and the cash flow is generated as investment income to investors; but in case of "secured 
financing" ,the sponsor just borrows funds from investors with the assets as guarantee, so the assets 
would remain on the balance sheet, and investors could ask the sponsor for reimbursement if  expected  
 
Investors in the market 
Selling loans 
Receiving cash 
Substandard loan to SPV 2 
Issuing ABS 40 Cash 40 
Fig.2  The capital adequacy under securitization with recourse 
 
The 
bank 
SPV 
（extra cash flows returning to the 
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40 
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Fig.1  The capital adequacy with Non-risk retained assets securitization 
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earnings could not be achieved. 
 
If the recourse is not higher than the historical record of the asset-backed defaults ratio, it is 
appropriate; but in case of transferring the assets with full recourse the sponsor will still bear the risks of 
possible assets loss and this transaction will be classified as secured loans, so neither the true sale nor 
risk isolation is achieved. 
Here 42 Yuan loan was securitized as guarantee to the 40 Yuan ABSs issued by the SPV. The SPV 
will carry out structural adjustment to make the principal and interest from loan securitization over the 
cost of management and income paid to the investors in accordance with the contract agreement. So long 
as the assets could generate cash flow sufficient to cover the cost of the above, the excess cash flow will 
return to the sponsoring bank. 
But if they want to upgrade the ABSs credit, requests for such credit enhancement by rating agencies 
are also growing. In Fig.2, 2 Yuan substandard loan was taken to the SPV. In fact, that was to concentrate 
credit risk of loan securitization to another financial instrument (that is, substandard loan). Compared 
with the initial potential loss, it became smaller, meanwhile the bank's capital adequacy ratio had been 
increased, and the core capital and total capital adequacy ratio reached 12.8% and 13.9%.  
It should be noted that if the recourse is provided improperly, commercial banks will probably take 
great risks in event of defaults. Generally speaking, if the transferring of recourse is not higher than the 
historical record of the asset-backed defaults ratio, it can be adopted; but if the assets are transferred with 
full recourse, the sponsor will also bear the risks of assets loss, and the transaction will be classified as 
secured loans, so neither the true sales nor risk isolation purpose is achieved. Under this circumstance, no 
actual reduction in risk occurs; only the performance of report is improved, which is also prone to 
happen in securitization. 
(d) The capital adequacy ratio when assets are neither owned nor sold by banks (no recourse) 
 
    
Here securitized assets were neither owned nor sold by the bank, which just provided credit 
enhancement (in the form of 2 Yuan substandard loan), not the recourse, so the 8% capital requirement 
should be applied to this condition. The bank here provided liquidity facilities and determined, with the 
SPV, the conditions, arrangement, the range of repayment, obligation to repay and the fees charged. 
When the shortage of funds occurred, the SPV would be able to utilize liquidity facilities to repay 
interest of securities to investors timely. Meanwhile the core capital and total capital adequacy ratio 
reached 12.8% and 13.9% due to the risks reduction. In addition, the bank also gained fees with little 
risk. 
Substandard loan to  
the SPV 2 
Liquidity facilities 
Cash 40 
Cash 42 
Applying loans42 
Borrowers  
Fig.3 The capital adequacy ratio when assets are neither owned nor sold by 
banks (no recourse) 
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3.  THE IMPACT OF ASSETS SECURITIZATION 
 
Asset securitization is a double-edged sword both to banks and the financial market. Banks utilize regulatory 
loopholes to conserve capital through restructuring assets or formally changing risks. Meanwhile asset securitization 
has also brought some problems not just of the banking, also of the entire financial market's healthy development. 
Experience of Western developed countries tells us that the RCA could create value to banks, at the same time， it 
may undermine the capital adequacy requirement as a prudent policy tool. So，regulatory department should have a 
priori expectation towards this problem.  
(a)Capital adequacy ratio will not be a true reflection of the risks the bank withstands. Under the 
framework of Basel Accord, difference exists between the real risks after asset securitization and the 
regulatory capital requirement according to adjusting results. Despite the preliminary and senior IRB 
methods have been taken into the new accord, such difference is hard to eliminate. One of the biggest 
risks is the "true sale" isn’t achieved and defined as secured financing. Under this circumstance, the 
movement of assets out of the balance sheet is not realized. The bank doesn’t reduce the original risks, in 
turn, it may get partial or total loss for the poor quality assets. Another problem is, the bank will, in order 
to maintain a good reputation, promise to repurchase assets sold when defaults occur, which definitely 
increases the risks to the bank. 
(b)Asset securitization will damage the conventional capital requirement as a prudential regulatory 
policy tool. Along with the sustainable progress of securitization tools, the development of RCA will be 
more rapid and cost-reduced. Banks can significantly reduce their regulatory capital requirements with 
no or tiny decreasing of total operating risks. Regulators will be unable to judge whether the commercial 
banks have reached the capital standard. To some extent, capital regulation is only a formality and risks 
of bank could not really be constrained.  
(c)As the existence of differences among different countries、the development extent of financial 
markets、supervision levels of the regulators、banking management and preferences of investors ,asset 
securitization could not develop equally to all banks. It will create unfair competition; generally, the 
large international banks will gain more regulatory concessions. 
(d)The conversion from non-flow loans to high-liquidity ABSs is realized by asset securitization. 
The gap between economic capital and regulatory capital makes banks taste benefits, which in turn 
encourages banks to securitize high quality assets, so the average quality of assets retained in the assets 
pool is decreasing and the 8% capital adequacy ratio is not enough. From above we see that the reported 
capital adequacy ratio often fails to reflect the true risk conditions, but has a misleading effect delaying 
corrective actions. 
 
4.   CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
As asset securitization may bring the above problems, maybe regulatory authorities choose to limit asset 
securitization. In fact, this approach is not wise, in the long run financial innovations will be discouraged. From the 
international scope of experiences, we can reduce the adverse effects from assets securitization through the 
following measures: 
(a) Methods to measure the true risks should be strengthened. According to the new Basel accord, 
capital adequacy constraints can be properly expanded and the accuracy, sensitivity and standardization 
of the risk measurement should be stressed so as to meet both of the corresponding capital exemption for 
some assets and the real capital requirements to the securitization risk exposure, making the bank 
regulatory capital gradually move closely to the economic capital. 
(b) Efficiency of capital regulating should be strengthened to reduce cost. Regulatory authorities 
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should set up an incentive structural system to play the leading and authoritative function in the financial 
system. Internal rating system should also be perfected so as to reflect bank risks more sufficiently, and 
not simply to raise capital adequacy ratio invariably. 
(c) The information disclosure in asset securitization should be strengthened. The eligibility of asset 
securitization is bound to be supervised and inspected. For the hidden nature and relatively stagnant 
regulation of the out of balance sheet businesses, according to the Basle Committee, participating banks 
in asset Securitization should fully disclose their participation information. Regulatory bodies will 
determine whether preferential capital should be given in accordance with relevant information, thus the 
participation of asset securitization transaction will be entirely under the public supervision, 
strengthening the banking prudential management and internal controls.  
   In China, asset securitization is a financial innovation for banks to broaden the financing channels 
and release risks. From the formation to a sound system, the development of any new things is a 
continuous process with understanding and practice. In short, the commercial banking sector is ought to 
improve risk measurement and management, perfect capital allocation and speed up the establishment of 
internal rating system; for capital regulation, the most important thing is to make regulatory capital 
requirements reflect the real risk measurement so as to eliminate the RCA motivation from the source, 
and ultimately achieving reunification of regulatory capital and economic capital. We can learn from the 
developed European commercial banks experience of asset securitization, refer to the Basel Committee's 
series of regulatory documents, and construct China's asset-backed securitization regulatory framework 
through reforming and innovation to guarantee reasonable risk controls of commercial banks and 
stability and security of the financial system.  
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